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I. INTRODUCTION
RAZIL public health policy concentrates about a quarter of its
total investment in research. Technological innovations bring
treatment alternatives and a better understanding of diseases in
addition to promoting new methods of treatment interventions. In this
complex environment, a conflict of interest arises between patent protec-
tion for medicines-property rights-on the one hand and ensuring uni-
versal access to healthcare on the other hand. This focuses on the debate
arising from technological innovation, namely the linkage between
health, economic, and social development, implying the need for reforms
for public health policy.
This article reflects on the right to health that arises from the right to
life, initially covering topics on human rights and public health in the
world; the legal model that governs patents and the clash of interests;
Brazil's vulnerability to the consumption of technologically-advanced
drugs and the use of flexibilities under the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS);1 and the final recogni-
tion that the reversal of priorities in this area favors inequalities over a
fundamental social right, the right to health.
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
According to the United Nations (UN), the world population reached
seven billion people in October 2011-this level was reached twelve years
after a baby born in Sarajevo, who was identified as the six billionth per-
son, and twenty-four years after the five billionth person was born in Bos-
nia.2 The arithmetic progression dates and demographic estimates may
be more symbolic than strict, but they raise the debate of growth versus
sustainability. Will natural resources and life in society sustain seven bil-
lion people? Are all individuals having fulfilling livelihoods? Have all
people secured their rights to health and well-being? The simple answer
to these questions would be: not yet!
The social, political, and economic inequalities in the contemporary
world increasingly deviate from the ideals expressed in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Structural differences of the countries
outline the current global health landscape. On one hand, in developed
countries the advances provided by studies in medicine lead to the im-
provement of a majority of their populations' health. On the other hand,
millions of people in developing countries suffer and die from many dis-
eases under sub-human conditions. Scholars, like David Landes, agree
that the unbalanced economic development underlying the major differ-
ences between wealth and poverty among nations are not the result of
chance. 3 Is it fair that humans die without assistance for simple diseases
in poor countries? And what can be done as the world's population in-
creases? Malthus's studies in the nineteenth century advanced the notion
of disordered population growth, and the World Health Organization
(WHO) introduced the concept of public health immediately after World
War II. These two variables are important in this study.
Viruses, bacteria, and many other microorganisms have caused more
deaths than all wars, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. 4 In the four-
teenth century, the bubonic plague ravaged Europe, killing 50 million
people. 5 The cholera epidemic in 1817 emerged and left hundreds of
thousands dead; tuberculosis killed 1 billion people between 1850 and
1950; smallpox left 300 million dead between 1896 and 1980; the Spanish
flu pandemic caused 20 million deaths between the years 1918 and 1919;
typhus caused 3 million deaths from 1918 to 1922; yellow fever left 30,000
dead between 1960 and 1962; measles caused the death of 6 million each
year since its emergence until 1963; and malaria has killed 3 million per
2. Stephanie Pappas, 7 Population Milestones for 7 Billion People, LVESCJENC-
(Oct. 11, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://www.livescience.com/16489-7-population-mile
stones-7-billion-people.html.
3. Marc Ferguson, Why The West?, 5 HisroRIA ACrUAL ONLINE 127, 129 (2004)
(quoting DAVID S. LANDEs, THE WEALTH AND PovE RTuY OF NATIONS: WiY
SoMw, ARF So RiCH AND SOME So POOR (1998)).
4. Infectious Diseases, BAYLOR C. Mm'lm., https://www.bcm.edu/departments/molecu
lar-virology-and-microbiology/id (last updated July 11, 2014).
5. Ole J. Benedictow, The Black Death: The Greatest Catastrophe Ever, HIsT. To-
DAY, Mar. 2005, 45.
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year since 1980.6 AIDS, identified in the United States and considered an
epidemic by the WHO in 1981, has killed 28 million people. 7
Across the globe, many deaths occur as consequences of infections and
parasitic diseases. There is also a high frequency of cases of cancer and
autoimmune diseases and there is a growing demand for transplants and
other medical events that require specialized treatment and advanced
medicines. 8 All these circumstances lead to the world's population being
directly dependent on complex drugs that require advanced research. It
should be noted that the drugs are considered as therapeutic instruments
to the medical community, whereas patients view them as a way to
achieve remission or relief from symptoms. In general, these specific
drugs have very high prices and are inaccessible to most consumers. Aris-
ing from this issue-between the need and the access to the medicines-
is a new concept that links individual assistance to every human being
and links collective health assistance through public policies. From basic
sanitation measures, which fought the bubonic plague, to current prophy-
lactic measures used to combat AIDS, to Brazil's grant for the acquisition
and advanced medicines provision through the Unified Health System
(SUS)-the issue of public health becomes a central theme. In the popu-
lation's health and disease process control, the states' actions are crucial
for individuals' access to health and well-being. In Brazil, the SUS's pur-
pose-as a state agency-is to ensure that all citizens have access to
health care. 9
From this perspective, when it comes to public health, Brazil empha-
sizes public awareness in health surveillance, health services organiza-
tions, and vaccination campaigns. All of these government interventions
are widely disseminated by the media. Universal access to essential
medicines is a highly relevant (and not sufficiently discussed) issue in the
public health policy debate when pursuing equal health care delivery that
promotes physical and mental well-being in a preventive and curative
manner. There are also issues related to biosafety policy that hinders ac-
cessibility to medicines.10
6. David Pegg, 25 Deadliest Diseases in Human History... Not Surprising, Ebola Is
One of Them, Lisi-25 (Jan. 8, 2013), http://list25.com/25-deadliest-diseases-in-
human-history/.
7. WORLu HEALfri OiRG., TiHi WouLD HFAI ''i REPORTi- 2003: SHAPING iiE Fu-
TURF 45 (2003).
8. The WHO considers tobacco use an epidemic, and estimates that one billion peo-
ple will die from tobacco use consequences in the twenty-first century (mostly can-
cers, but also heart, veins, and lung diseases), which demands high health
expenses. The tobacco use problem is more critical in developing countries. See,
e.g., MARCOS VAI.AIAO, RiGULATrOI.Y ToBAcco TAx FRAMEWORK: A FEASIBLE
SOILUTION TO A GiOBAL HEAlUIl PROBLIEM 107-08 (2012).
9. Brazil's March Towards Universal Coverage, 88 BuLLi iEriN OF WORLD HEAlIi
Oizc. 641, 641-716, available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/9/10-
020910/enl.
10. See, e.g., Megan Dunagan, Bioprospection versus Biopiracy and the United States
versus Brazil. Attempts at Creating an Intellectual Property System Applicable
Worldwide When Differing Views are Worlds Apart-and Irreconcilable?, 15 L. &
Bus. Ri-v. AM. 603 (2009).
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The patent rights of medicines, and their resulting restrictions outlined
below, create important legal issues that affect global health.11 If these
issues are not properly addressed, there may be an increase in socioeco-
nomic disparities among nations.
III. THE LEGAL PROTECTION AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The central issue of this article is the dilemma between the right to
health and the right to property. In this context, the right to health refers
to the public interest in decent living conditions and welfare accessibility,
including the right to information; culture; development; and in this spe-
cific case, the right to access medicines and health procedures that can
ensure health in a broader concept. The right to property focuses on pri-
vate enterprises' interests, such as ownership, free enterprise, free compe-
tition, profit, and economic development. The questions that underlie the
apparent divide of these two interests are how to promote wider access to
medicines and ensure each citizen's individual rights, while protecting the
industrial property rights of the drug researchers and product developers.
This conflict requires mediation between the fundamental right to health
and the right to intellectual property. This issue creates a dilemma with
ramifications reaching the constituent fields of law, agreements, and in-
ternational policies.
In Brazil, Industrial Property Law is regulated by Law No. 9,279, of
May 14, 1996.12 This law states:
Article 6. It shall be assured to the author of an invention or a utility
model the right to obtain a patent that guarantees his property,
under the conditions established in this Law.
Article 8. An invention is patentable if it satisfies the requirements
of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application.
Article 11. An invention and utility model are considered to be new
if they are not part of the state of the art.
11. See, e.g., id.; Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open Access to Es-
sential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MiEo. & ETIcs 184
(2009); Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Com-
pulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKiEy Ti cii. L.J.
853 (2003); Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, I1, Pandemics and Panaceas:
The World Trade Organization's Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and
Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 353 (2004); Stacey B. Lee, Can Incentives
to Generic Manufacturers Save the Doha Declaration's Paragraph 6?, 44 Gio. J.
INT'L L. 1387 (2013); Bryan C. Mercurio, Trips, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving
Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. IN'IEL. PROi,. L. Ri;v. 211 (2004);
Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the Trips Agreement for Developing Countries:
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34
GiEo. WASH. INT'[. L. Riv. 191, 192 (2002).
12. Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, DiAiwio OICIAL )A UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
15.05.1996 (Braz.). There is a bill of law pending for approval in the National
Congress, which will modify the current Law. See Projeto de Lei No. 5402/2013, de
18 de Abril de 2013 (Braz.), available at http://www.camara.gov.brlproposicoes
Web/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=572965.
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Article 13. An invention is endowed with inventive step provided
that, to a technician versed in the subject, it is not derived in an evi-
dent or obvious way from the state of the art.
Article 15. An invention and a utility model are considered suscepti-
ble of industrial application when they can be used or produced in
any kind of industry.
Industrial Property Law regulates the rights related to industrial or
commercial activities, subdivided into patents, utility models, industrial
designs, geographical indications, and topographies of integrated
circuits. 13
In regards to medicines, the law grants patent rights for products and
processes, assuring the holder exclusivity for a specified period (usually
fifteen to twenty years) for exploiting a given invention.1 4 But the inno-
vative technique, which involves the development and production pro-
cess, will be transferred by state grant. International literature shows
significant differences between developed and developing countries in
the propensity to use technologically appropriate methods. The develop-
ing countries are not a homogeneous group; Asian and Latin American
nations, for example, show substantial differences in their developmental
stages.
For the pharmaceutical industry, the temporary exclusivity conferred
by the patent becomes important for recovering a sufficient return on
investment for research expenses. The patented product reduces compe-
tition and allows the proprietor to price the products. The resulting drug
price is closely related to market factors, and includes the product's de-
gree of innovation, the amount of competition (based on similar products
available for the same health problem), the brand valuation (pharmaceu-
tical marketing), and research investment costs.
Brazilian Patent Law (article 40) grants patent rights for inventions for
twenty years (in line with TRIPS); starting from the filing of the request,
it cannot run fewer than ten years after the official recognition by the
national agency.1 5 The law also allows for the issuing of a compulsory
license, by administrative or judicial review (article 68), in cases where
the patent holder exercises his rights in an abusive manner, or "abuses his
economic power, proven pursuant to law in an administrative or judicial
decision" and other particular situations (article 68);16 this disposition is
particularly important for the issues discussed in this paper and will be
properly addressed in part IV.17
13. GABIII1.A COSTA CHIAVI7S, PAI'N-IhS FARMACU-TICAS: POR Qut' DIuiUTAM 0
AcissO A MIEDICAMENTOS? [PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: WtHY MAKE AccEss
To MLDICINrS DIFCuL'r?] 8 (2006).
14. Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 15.05.1996, art. 40 (Braz.).
15. Id.
16. Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 15.05.1996, art. 68 (Braz.).
17. Brazilian scholars assume that compulsory licenses for medicine are a tool to grant
the fundamental right to health. See, e.g., Thana Cristina de Campos, A Licenca
Compuls6ria de Medicamentos como Politica Pfiblica de Satide [The Compulsory
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At this point, the legal protection of patents becomes essential for uni-
versal access to medicines. This is because, on the one hand, entrepre-
neurs need to have their rights guaranteed against knowledge and
property globalization rights (including the virtual ones). On the other
hand, the world population, especially that which inhabits the least devel-
oped countries (economically and technologically speaking), cannot re-
main isolated from the benefits brought by advances in medical research.
Seen in this light, the false contradiction between public interest and pri-
vate interest emerges because no individual right is above the public
interest.
This observation is reinforced by Patricia Carvalho, who refers to the
private interests' legal limitation. 18 The author warns that property rights
are limited when the state grants exclusive ownership of properties in the
public interest. 19 Access to medicines should be seen as part of the right
to health, constituting "a right for all and the State's duty"-here a clear
evocation of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil articles
6 and 196, which state:
Article 6. Education, health, work, housing, leisure, security, social
security, protection of motherhood and childhood, and assistance to
the destitute, are social rights, as set forth by this Constitution. (As
amended)
Article 196. Health is a right of all and a duty of the state and shall
be guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed at
reducing the risk of illness and other hazards and at the universal
and equal access to actions and services for its promotion, protection
and recovery.20
Soon after the right to health was enacted, its guarantee to protect
against the spread of epidemic diseases was used to justify state interven-
tion. But the state intervened for economic reasons, not just for human
rights concerns.21 Nowadays, the state must stabilize the relationship be-
tween health and trade. It is the state's responsibility to ensure access to
medicines by producing, acquiring, or partnering state power with indus-
try. It is at the state level, most recently through the regulatory agencies,
which determines the law of industrial property through legal devices,
organizations, international agreements, and policies.
License of Medicines Public Health Policy], 102 REVISTA DA FACULDADE D,
DIREITO IDA UNIVEIRSIDADI . DIE SAO PAUL O 759 (2007).
18. Patricia Luciane de Carvalho, A Protefdo da Propriedade Intelectual como Ques-
tdo de Satlde Pablica-o Caso dos Medicamentos e Cosmiticos [The Protection of
Intellectual Property as a Matter of Public Health-The Case of Drugs and Cosmet-
ics], 11 REVISTA D DIREITO SANITARIO 189, 200 (2010).
19. See id.
20. CONsTrrui<:Ao FIcii.AL [C.F.] [CONSTUrTIoN] art. 6, 196 (Braz.).
21. See generally Patricia Luciane de Carvalho, 0 Acesso a Medicamentos e as Patentes
Farmacjuticas na Ordem Juridica Brasileira [The Access to Medicines and Pharma-
ceutical Patents in the Brazilian Legal Order], 11 DiRIuTO A PROPRIuDAFo. IN-
Ti FCUAL, 94, 94-102 (2007).
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An effective public policy regarding access to medicines provides a
good cost-benefit ratio to states because the prophylactic treatment of
diseases may result in cost-effective interventions against a widespread
epidemic.
In Brazil, public debate on access to medicines has become more in-
tense since 1996 with the filing of the first lawsuits based on constitutional
individual rights, claiming the right to more efficient and advanced
medicines to treat HIV, followed by the enactment of the previously
mentioned patent law (Law. 9.279/96, regulating the rights and obliga-
tions relating to industrial property), and the enactment of Law 9.313/96,
which provides free medicines to HIV and AIDS patients. 22 As a result
of civil society mobilization, Law 9.787/99 was enacted in 1999, establish-
ing the policy for generic drugs in Brazil. 23
Brazil's consolidated pharmaceutical drug laws were contained in new
legislation composed of Laws 9.313/96 (Sarney's Law) and 9.787/99 (Ge-
neric Drugs Law), which represented a turning point of the Brazilian gov-
ernment's position on patent and health care issues especially in: actions
concerning innovations and requirements in pharmaceutical production,
testing quality and bioequivalence, and prescribing generic drug alterna-
tives. During this period, the Brazilian government faced reactions for
which it had to take regulatory measures to address emerging problems,
among them, the threat of international retaliation.2 4
Law 9.279/96 (Industrial Property Law), intended to adapt Brazilian
law to rules of international law established under the WTO in December
1996,25 has created more problems. These adjustments in national law-
particularly the obligation to grant patents to the pharmaceutical indus-
try-have hindered the universal access in Brazil's current policy.26 The
problem comes from multilateral agreements signed by WTO members,
mainly TRIPS, which established the requirement for recognition of in-
22. Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 15.05.1996 (Braz.); Lei No. 9.313,
de 13 de Novembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 14.11.1996 (Braz.); Gabriela Costa Chaves
& Renata Reis, Challenges for the Universal Access to Medicines in Brazil - Brief
Comments from Civil Society, http://www.sxpolitics.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/
04/challenges-universal-access-medicines.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
23. Angelina M. M. Basso et al., Biopharmaceutical and Biosimilar Products in Brazil.
from Political to Biotechnological Overview, J. BIzFOUIVAIENCIE & BIOAVAI-
LABLITY (2013), available at http://omicsonline.org/biopharmaceutical-and-bio
similar-products-in-brazil-from-political-to-biotechnological-overview-jbb.1000135
.pdf.
24. A Generic Drug is similar to a reference or innovative product. It is intended to
be interchangeable, and is usually produced after the expiration or waiver of pat-
ent protection or other proprietary rights, proven its effectiveness, safety, and
quality product. See Lei No. 9.787, de 10 de Fevereiro de 1999 (Braz.). It makes it
easier for a medicine manufacturer, who is not the original patent holder, to initi-
ate production without the extremely difficult initial requirements to market a new
medicine.
25. Gabriela Costa Chaves et al., Acesso a Medicamentos e Propriedade Intelectual no
Brasil: Reflexdes e Estratdgias da Sociedade Civil [Access to Medicines and Intellec-
tual Property in Brazil: Reflections and Strategies of Civil Society], 8 RFVISTA IN-
TERNACIONAI 1) Dinu.ITos HUMANOS 171, 174 (2008).
26. Id.
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tellectual property for all technology fields, including the pharmaceutical
industry.27
In other words, TRIPS established the minimum standard for intellec-
tual property protection, i.e., minimum rules that WTO members should
adopt in their national laws relating to intellectual property rights. 28
Prior to the issuance of TRIPS, many countries did not recognize patents
in the pharmaceutical industry.29 But it is important to note that nations
such as Brazil and Thailand only conducted their previous programs to
fight endemic diseases, and the main drugs employed were produced lo-
cally and not protected by patents.30
The minimum standards established by TRIPS do not equally benefit
WTO members because the exclusivity right (the patent attribute) can
affect the imported product price, innovations, and information technol-
ogy availability. 3' Therefore, countries with a greater investment capac-
ity for developing research and technology investment have greater
advantages over countries that do not have an organized patents system
and do not invest so heavily in technological innovations.
IV. THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS AND THE
BRAZILIAN APPROACH
Possible abuses arising from TRIPS can be resolved by certain actions
and devices. Article 8 of TRIPS, for example, states that WTO members
"adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in vital importance sectors to their socio-eco-
nomic and technological development sectors, since such measures are
consistent with the Agreement. ' '32
These "necessary measures" aimed at the public interests are called
"TRIPS flexibilities, ' ' 33 among them are the compulsory license (Article
31); parallel imports (article 6); experimental use (article 30), the Bolar
exception (article 30); and the health sector participation in the pharma-
ceutical patent applications processes (implicit in Article 8). These
TRIPS flexibilities can be taken alone or combined, but they have limita-
tions in their application that usually involve actions within the economy
and world politics; the countries they consider necessary to apply the flex-
ibilities should be aware of the effects in the international business
environment.
Compulsory licensing-with its most immediate effect being flexibil-
ity-means temporarily suspending the pharmaceutical patent right and
27. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
1.
28. CHAVS, supra note 13, at 15.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id.
31. CHAVES, supra note 13, at 15.
32. Id. at 18.
33. Id. at 19.
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using the patented invention without the invention holder's consent. 34
The patent breaking resulting from compulsory licensing can only be im-
posed if the rights deriving from the product exclusivity are improperly
exercised by the patent holder or through an agent (usually a drug com-
pany). The Law does not allow for the abuse of economic power when it
is related to human health. Articles 68 to 74 of the Industrial Property
Law address this issue. Article 68 states:
Section III
Compulsory License
68. The titleholder shall be subject to having the patent licensed on a
compulsory basis if he exercises his rights derived therefrom in an
abusive manner, or by means thereof engages in abuse of economic
power, proven pursuant to law in an administrative or judicial
decision.
(1) The following also occasions a compulsory license:
I. non-exploitation of the object of the patent within the Brazil-
ian territory for failure to manufacture or incomplete manufac-
ture of the product, or also failure to make full use of the
patented process, except cases where this is not economically
feasible, when importation shall be permitted; or
II. commercialization that does not satisfy the needs of the
market.
(2) A license may be requested only by a person having a legitimate
interest and having technical and economic capacity to effectively ex-
ploit the object of the patent, that shall be destined predominantly
for the domestic market, in which case the exception contained in
item I of the previous paragraph shall be extinguished.
(3) In the case that a compulsory license is granted on the grounds
of abuse of economic power, the licensee who proposes local manu-
facture shall be assured a period, limited to the provisions of article
74, to import the object of the license, provided that it was intro-
duced onto the market directly by the titleholder or with his consent.
(4) In the case of importation to exploit a patent and in the case of
importation as provided for in the preceding paragraph, third parties
shall also be allowed to import a product manufactured according to
a process or product patent, provided that it has been introduced
onto the market by the titleholder or with his consent.
(5) The compulsory license that is the subject of paragraph 1 shall
only be required when 3 (three) years have elapsed since the patent
was granted.3 5
Articles 69 and 70 bring exceptions to the general rule, Articles 71 and
72 deal with the exclusiveness of compulsory licenses, and Articles 73 and
74 regulate how the compulsory licensing is implemented and exercised. 36
34. Id. at 19.
35. Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 15.05.1996, art. 68 (Braz.).
36. Id. at art. 68-74.
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These actions relating to compulsory licensing, if taken abruptly, cause
the opposite effect to its purpose, i.e., they impede the drug's accessibility
because there is no denying the state's dependence to the private sector
in the research stages, development, and product commercialization.
Government intervention may affect the industry's interest in investment
and drug production. But sometimes public interest, according to the
law, allows for compulsory license. In fact, the Brazilian government has
used this strategy a couple of times. 37
The Brazilian government has implemented a health program provid-
ing for the free treatment of AIDS.38 This program, which began effec-
tively in the early 1990s, has been affected by the high prices of anti-
AIDS medicines. 39 In 2001, the medicine Nelfinavir (anti-AIDS re-
troviral) was threatened to be subject to compulsory licensing. A state
laboratory (Farmanguinhos) would produce the medicine, making it
available to the population for a price 40 percent less than the original
laboratory (Roche) price.40 Other products were under negotiation such
as Kaletra, Tenofovir, and Efavirenz, anti-AIDS retroviral drugs manu-
factured by Abbott, Gilead, and Merck, respectively.41 But the Ministry
of Health and pharmaceutical companies were able to negotiate lower
prices and make Nelfinavir, as well as other AIDS drugs, affordable for
the Program. 42 But prices still increased, and more recently, in 2007, the
Brazilian government broke the patent on Efavirenz, allowing the gov-
ernment to buy a generic version of the medicine at a cheaper price. 4
3
The measure only applies for public non-commercial use.44 First, Brazil
imported it from India, and then, starting in 2008, initiated domestic pro-
duction. 45 Regarding this issue and the dispute between Merck and Bra-
zilian Health System, Vera Zolotaryova wrote:
37. See JAMES PACKARD Lovi, RECENT EXAMI'IES OF CoMIPUI.SORY LICENSE ON
PATENTS 14 (2007), available at http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/
recent cls_8mar07.pdf.
38. See HIV& AIDS in Brazil, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-brazil.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2014).
39. The program is a successful public health program. There was an increase in the
survival of patients with AIDS in about five years; the program also promoted a
decrease of 80 percent in hospitalization costs, generating economy of approxi-
mately $2.3 billion. The success of such program was primarily due to the domes-
tic manufacture of drugs that are used in the treatment and do not enjoy patent
protection in Brazil. But the high price of drugs has impacted the program after
Patent Law entered into force. See Chaves et al., supra note 25, at 171.
40. Ricardo Mignone & Denise Mandueflo, Brasil Quebra Patente de Remddio contra
AIDS [Brazil Breaks Patent on AIDS Drug] FoLHA DE S. PAULO (Aug. 22, 2001),
http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/folha/ciencia/ult306u4664.shtml.
41. Campos, supra note 17, at 780.
42. Id.
43. Katia Cortes, Brazil Breaks Patent on Merck's Efavirenz AIDS Drug (Update 3),
BiLOOMBER (May 4, 2007), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aAHMaYgcQA4o.
44. Decreto No 6.108, de 4 de maio de 2007, D.O.U. de 07.05.2007 (Braz.).
45. Brazil to Produce Generic Version of Merck's Antirettroviral Efavirenz, KAISER
HEAl'r! NiEws (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/
2008/September/i 8/dr00054526.aspx?p=1.
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Moreover, Brazil's use of the compulsory licensing provision was ap-
propriate because it is necessary for Brazil to use the compulsory
licensing provision in order to maintain its successful HIV/AIDS
program. The cost of Brazil's HIV/AIDS program is rising, partially
due to the high costs of second-line HIV/AIDS medication. In addi-
tion, an important part of Brazil's success in its HIV/AIDS program
is due to Brazil's ability to bargain for lower prices with pharmaceu-
tical companies by threatening to issue a compulsory license. By
utilizing the compulsory licensing provision after repeated threats to
do so, Brazil sends a clear message to pharmaceutical companies that
it is serious about the health of its citizens. 46
And by comparing the Brazilian case with the Thai case against Abbott
drug manufacturer the same author stated:
Second, Brazil's situation is different from Thailand because Brazil
attempted to negotiate with Merck for two years prior to issuing the
license. Although prior negotiations may not have been necessary
under the national emergency or non-commercial use exceptions of
the compulsory licensing provision, Brazil's willingness to negotiate
an agreement with Merck prior to issuing the license sends a positive
signal to pharmaceutical companies by demonstrating that Brazil is
serious about patent protection. 47
In 2012, the Efavirenz compulsory license was extended for five more
years.4 8 But Brazil is not alone on this issue. Other countries, including
the United States and Canada, have also granted compulsory licenses for
drugs, and, in fact, this issue is becoming more relevant. 49
When issuing a compulsory license, the state needs a strategy to com-
pensate for the lack of private sector support. In other words, it must
assume responsibility for the production, development, and sale of the
products. To this end, the Brazilian government can use state laborato-
ries that are able to produce medicines under compulsory license.5 0
It is important to consider that the compulsory license is temporary,
effective only during the time when the product is needed to restore pub-
46. Vera Zolotaryova, Are We There Yet? Taking "TRIPS" to Brazil and Expanding
Access to HIVIAIDS Medication, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1099, 1121 (2008).
47. Id. at 1122-23.
48. Decreto no 7.723, de 4 de maio de 2012. D.O. U. de 07.05.2012 (Braz.). For a
detailed timeline on compulsory licensing in Brazil from the beginning until April,
2008, see JENNRYN WIE1ZIR & ANA AYALA, TiMELINI7 ON BRAZIL'S COMPUL.-
SORY LICENSING (2008).
49. See generally, Cecilia Oh, Compulsory Licenses: Recent Experiences in Developing
Countries, 1 INT'L J. INTni L. PROP. MGMT. 22 (2006); Sangeet Shashikant, More
Countries Use Compulsory License, But New Problems Emerge, TtmttD WORLD
Ni iWORK (May 19, 2005), www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/twninfo
health004.htm; MARTIN Kitok, PA'TNiS, COMPULSORY LIClNSES AND Acciss To
MEDICINES: SOME RiECENT Ext'nRtt NCES, (2009), available at http://www.twnside
.org.sg/title2/IPR/pdf/iprl0.pdf; Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to in-
novation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18
BI RKIt ..Y Tjcii. L.J. 853 (2003).
50. See generally Shashikant, supra note 49.
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lic health.5 1 The private sector cannot bear the political, budgetary, or
state management inefficiency burdens. Compulsory licensing's usage is
subject to an abnormal condition, an example being epidemic out-
breaks. 52 In addition to these constraints, the compulsory license also
implies that the nation acquires the technological capability and industrial
facilities to produce the drug.53
The threat of compulsory licensing is regarded as a price negotiation
mechanism between the states and the drug industries. 54 In connection
with the negotiation, the WTO member countries (in underdeveloped or
developing positions) are recommending joint actions with the private
sector for research, development, and marketing, always focused on ef-
fective technology transfer. 55
Parallel importation-another "flexibility" under the TRIPS agree-
ment-allows importing a patented drug put on the market by the owner
or a third party authorized by the agreement. 56 Regarding the drug's ac-
cessibility, the possibility of parallel importation is significant, since mul-
tinational pharmaceutical companies often provide "different prices for
the same drug in different countries. '57 Importing allows purchasing the
drug where it is being sold at the lowest price.58 The import is linked to
the compulsory license, since a country can put into practice the importa-
tion, and therefore give adequate time for local exploration of the com-
pulsorily licensed drug.59
The experimental use flexibility, and the experimental use Bolar Ex-
ception, are more linked to scientific and technological work that is re-
quired for effective accessibility to drugs. 60  The first flexibility-
experimental use-attaches to scientific research using the patented drug,
allowing the information use and technological development promo-
tion.61 The second flexibility, Bolar Exception, also known as "early
work," allows a public or private laboratory to use the patented drug for
testing aimed at obtaining the sanitary record in drug regulatory
agencies. 62
The flexibility mentioned here refers to the action taken by the Brazil-
ian government in the pharmaceutical patent applications analysis pro-
cess, denying the grant to requests that do not meet legal requirements
for patents. 63 This is an assignment for the Brazilian Health Surveillance
51. Carvalho, supra note 18, at 202.
52. Id.
53. CHAVES, supra note 13, at 21.
54. See id. at 20-1.
55. See id. at 29.
56. Id. at 22.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 24.
60. CJ IEvrs, supra note 13, at 24.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 28.
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Agency (ANVISA).64 Note that the ANVISA's responsibility in approv-
ing patents is not only to interfere in the empowerment process, but it
also is a measure for the citizens' protection, preventing the introduction
of patented medicines with harmful health effects to the population. 65
This flexibility combined with the experimental use are medium and long-
term measures that can promote the national technological
development. 66
Another aspect is the so-called Doha Declaration's paragraph 6, which
is an amendment to TRIPS, intended to ensure developing countries ac-
cess to affordable medicines when they do not have domestic manufac-
turers capable of producing medicines under compulsory license (the
effect is a flexibility on article 31(f) of TRIPS, which is the "domestic
rule"). 67 In this case, Brazilian manufacturers would be able to take ad-
vantage of the provision, as Indian manufactures do, because it provides
that member countries "can now export generic pharmaceutical products
made under compulsory licenses to meet the needs of importing countries
subject to certain conditions. '6 8 But there is a lot of criticism on this
Doha Declaration regarding its effectiveness in solving developing and
less developed countries' needs. 69
Among all TRIPS flexibilities in recent years, the compulsory license-
perhaps by having an immediate effect-has received strong support
from Brazilian citizens, especially because of the antiretroviral drugs
made accessible to HIV patients. It is important to observe that, as stated
before, this flexibility was implemented only by Brazil in 2007 for the
drug Efavirenz, produced by Merck, showing the state commitment to
the National STD/AIDS Program and the public health system. 70
It is noteworthy that the flexibilities discussed here are based on
TRIPS (resulting from international policies). But some rules of interna-
tional law privilege protect the right to property over the broad access to
64. Id.
65. Id. at 39.
66. See id. at 26-27.
67. Lee, supra note 11, at 1398-99.
68. Id.
69. See Carlos M. Correa, 0 Acordo TRIPS e o acesso a medicamentos nos paises em
desenvolvimento [TRIPS Agreement and Access to Drugs in Developing Coun-
tries], 2 Suiz REVIS''A INTERNACIONAI. mI1 Dn i.iros HUMANOS, 26-39 (2005),
available at http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1806-64452005000200003&script
=sciarttext#txl9 (as it was put by Lee: "Sources of generic ARV s and other drugs
are diminishing. The 2016 deadline by which all countries must become TRIPS
compliant steadily approaches. This means that absent a TRIPS-required compul-
sory license, developing countries will lose access to generic versions of drugs still
under patent. Those countries then will have to rely exclusively on patented drugs
and, in the absence of competition from generics, pay prices set by the manufactur-
ers. Within a decade, the Doha Declaration's inadequate Paragraph 6 may be the
only available mechanism for Africa and other developing countries with insuffi-
cient manufacturing capabilities to import essential medicine at competitive pric-
ing. It is time for a renewed focus on how Paragraph 6 compulsory licenses can be
reworked to succeed in the future."). See Stacey Lee, Access Denied, ONE (2013),
available at http://carey.jhu.edu/one/2013/spring/access-denied/.
70. Kiioiz, supra note 11, at 49.
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public health. Additionally, under Brazilian law, one may find internal
problems, particularly considering the rules concerning the national pat-
ent system and its implementation which, in its applicative instance, un-
dermine the right to health. The main internal problems are the pipeline
mechanism and the guidelines in the patent examination prepared by the
National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI). 71 The administrative
difficulties are evident in the congressional voting process when the Min-
istry of Health is positioning itself against the pharmaceutical analysis
process and TRIPS-plus.
As a temporary rule, the pipeline mechanism allows patent applica-
tions in technological fields not recognized until Law 9.279/96 (Industrial
Property Law) is enacted-two examples being pharmaceutical and food
fields.72 Through this mechanism, patent applications are not subject to
the formal national patentability analysis (i.e., they are not examined by
the criteria for "novelty," "activity," and "industrial application"), be-
cause it would have followed the process patent terms abroad. 73 In the
Brazilian case, the pipeline protected, retroactively, other countries' filed
or already existing patents without considering the adjustment period
provided in Act 9.279/96.74
With respect to patent examination guidelines adopted by the INPI,
they guide examiners' function in interpreting the Brazilian patent law on
what should qualify for patent protection. But these guidelines are often
more extensive than the rules contained in the intellectual property na-
tional legislation and are at loggerheads with the goals expressed in the
Brazilian Constitution protecting intellectual property (art. 50, XXIX of
the Federal Constitution, 1988), generating several patent grants that did
not meet rules in effect, in the country.75 The aforementioned disposition
of the Brazilian Constitution states as follows:
Art. 5 [this article lists individual rights]:
XXIX-the law shall ensure the authors of industrial inventions of a
temporary privilege for their use, as well as protection of industrial
creations, property of trademarks, names of companies and other
distinctive signs, viewing the social interest and the technological and
economic development of the country.76
The Brazilian Ministry of Health has difficulty in positioning itself
against pharmaceutical analysis processes. The Brazilian intellectual
property law says that requests for drug patents must obtain the
ANVISA's prior approval because it is relevant to the public health. 77
INPI does not publish the ANVISA decisions, leaving the pending patent




75. Chaves et al, supra note 25, at 182.
76. CONSITUTrIUICAo FrDEAI. [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.).
77. Chaves et al., supra note 25, at 182-83.
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application-which benefits the patent holder maintaining the product
monopoly-while not terminating the patenting process. 78
Thus, in Brazil, the draft TRIPS-plus laws represent a significant limita-
tion to the public interest in granting patents on medicines. This is
because the draft TRIPS-plus law exceeds the minimum TRIPS require-
ments to ensure the private sectors rights that are involved in the issue.
Some authors cite as an intensification example the bill of law n. 29/
2006, 79 which provides the link between patent protection and drug regis-
tration (also known as "linkage"). This measure would require the Bolar
Exception annulment. The Bolar Exception principle is in the indepen-
dence between drug registration and the patent term, allowing the pro-
ceedings for generic production to have their initiation before the patent
expires.80 In other words, the Bolar Exception invalidation allows ge-
neric producers to get the sanitary registration without waiting for the
patent to expire, which would allow them to sell the drugs, allowing the
entry of the generic versions in the market.81
V. FINAL REMARKS
The purpose of this article was to analyze how Brazilian law, repre-
sented by the Intellectual Property Law and the rules for patent
medicines, aims to maintain a state of social welfare allowing all citizens
the access to health, while respecting international treaties and agree-
ments that protect intellectual property.
The apparent opposition between the Right to Health and the Right to
Property is a controversial subject because it derives from actions per-
taining to the legal and political fields. This article reflects on the trade of
life, since the growing demographic, evolution, and history regarding the
serious diseases or epidemics in this global context evokes increasing de-
mand for new research and new process developments that would restore
people's health and preserve their lives.
In the advancement of medical and pharmaceutical products, techno-
logical, economic, and social inequalities that divide developed and devel-
oping countries persists. Developing countries do not have the economic,
political, nor military power to assert their interests in the international
context, and this must be considered in international negotiations. In-
vestments in research and innovation dedicated to the sector are
favorable to the developed countries because the multinational corpora-
tions are headquartered in such countries. These corporations dominate
the market and invariably have better conditions for applying resources
to scientific research subsidized by the state.
78. Id. at 183.
79. See generally, Projeto de Lei do Senado Federal n. 29, de 2006 (Senator Ney Suas-
suna), DiAmio )O SENADO FED iR. de 7 de fevereiro de 2006 (Braz.), available at
http://www.deolhonaspatentes.org.br/media/file/Proj-Leis/PL_29-03.pdf (last vis-
ited May 16, 2014).
80. See CHAVIHS, supra note 13, at 24.
81. See id.
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Under these conditions, will it be acceptable to consider that citizens
born in certain countries have more rights to life than others born in less
fortunate countries? No! Laws and legal actions exist so that people can
receive different treatment, but still be entitled to the same adequate liv-
ing conditions under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even
in the richest nations, it is not possible for all citizens to have the right to
the same assistance and the best technologies. Then again, the private
sector cannot be punished by having their property (patents) and profits
(return on investment applied) expropriated because the state is not able
to manage the public health demands.
As exposed in this article, there seems to be an insurmountable conflict
between the WTO agenda on drug product patents, creating international
trade and protective rules, and the WHO, responsible for promoting
health by subsidizing research. In other words, there is a policy contra-
diction between the economic values represented by the WTO and the
public interest in free access to medicines represented by the WHO.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that these two international organizations
have established a joint study to address such issues. 82 In this study WTO
and WHO manage the medicine used for vaccines and other treatments
related to various diseases.83 The partnership between the WTO and
WHO seeks to harmonize the conflicts of interest between their
organizations.
But it is a responsibility of the states, supported by legal authority,
which ensures that the right to health outweighs the right to property,
especially concerning access to medicines. Medication access for public
health is a function which concerns the state. Many times, civil actions
are filed in order to ensure the access to medicines, creating highs costs
that are invariably charged to vulnerable state budgets. In this sense,
countries need to seek alternatives, including partnerships between public
and private interests and the use of flexibilities (like compulsory licens-
ing), as mentioned above. This includes cases where the law or legal ne-
gotiating tools can be used to pressure the pharmaceutical industry to
lower drug prices, making it accessible for the population.
It was observed that the draft law, TRIPS-plus, and other Brazilian
intellectual property protection system weaknesses may be a setback in
promoting public access to medicines. Since 1998, fifty draft laws con-
cerning drugs and how the pharmaceutical industry works in Brazil have
been under consideration in Congress. These include PL 230/03, which
limits the substances patent protection rights regarded as drug compo-
nents manufactured by state laboratories (bill was filed on the table Di-
rector Chamber of Deputies) and PL 303/03, which handles compulsory
licensing in cases where there are no patent object manufacturing (ap-
82. See generally WTO AGREEMENTS AND PUBiic HFAL-1-xi-A JOINT STUDY 13Y
WHO AND THE WTO S-CREITARIAT (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/eng
lish/res_e/booksp elwho wto-e.pdf.
83. Id.
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pended to PL 139/99 amending Law No. 9279 of May 14, 1996).84
In the Brazilian case, the reflection on the dilemma-public interest
versus private interests-is a big challenge, characterized by many im-
passes involving the pharmaceutical industry, lawsuits, and legislation de-
velopment. But these impasses are not widely discussed in various
spheres involved with the issues. State and civil society should unite to
search for alternatives within the current patent system, but, above all,
promote national and international discussions on the subject. A more
thorough debate will yield more interest, ensuring the public interest to
be paramount. It is socially unjust, as well as unsustainable and economi-
cally inefficient, for the state to offer public health based on ability to pay
rather than on people's needs.
84. See generally Projeto de Lei No. 230 de 2003, available at http://www
.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?id Proposicao= 105268; Projeto
de Lei No. 303 de 2011, available at http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/
fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=491567; Projeto de Lei No. 139, DiAiRio DA
CAMARA Dos DEPUTADOS, de 19 de Marqo de 1999, available at http://www.deol
honaspatentes.org.br/media/file/ProjLeis/PL_29-03.pdf; Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de
Maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 15.05.1996 (Braz.).
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